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BOOK REVIEWS

A.DISALVO

Alasdair Macintyre. Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry:Encyclopaedia,
Genealogy, and Tradition. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1990.
There is something~ in the title of Alasdair Macintyre's latest book.
It implies that he will focus on morality, when in fact, his topic is nothing less
than thetensionbetweena pluralityof rationalities to which therontemporary
university is blind. But, in commenting on three over-arching models of
reason, Macintyre sketches three distinct types of activity, each of which is
rational, none of which is commensurable to the other. The "versions" turn
out to be "rivals:" they compete. Thus their current manyness is merely
provisional, unstable and at best a stage along the way to triumph for one
over the others. A question stalking the title of this book is twofold: how is
this rivalry po~ible and how long can it last Which version can and must
vanquish its rivals is the explicit question to which Macintyre invites the
reader. Yet it is also foreclosed, preemptively decided by his implicit
selection of criteria from one of the alternate versions with which to judge the
other two. Thus the one wins whose tem\S are used to name the rivahy. In
being successfully described, the rivalry is decisively concluded.
Which of the rival modes of inquiry does Macintyre favor? His money
is not on the version of rationality that in his view rurrently predominates in
American universities. He characterizes that predominant brand of inquiry
as projecting an unattainable ideal of pure objectivity. Its exemplar and
sweetest fruit was the ninth edition of the Encycl~ia Britannica (18751889), traditionally known as the "scholar'sencyclopedia." Macintyre writes
that the ninth edition Britannica presents a single method and canon for each
academic discipline, thus propagating the Enlighterunent ideal of the ability
of human reason to attain ~versal and disinterest~ knowledge. This ideal
of pure objectivity he points out, is fonnally supported by the genre of the
encyclopedia article, a genre within whichasinglevoicespeaksauthoritatively,
immune from objections. Macintyre argues that instructional practices
within the contemporary universities mimic textual practices in the
encyclopedia: a single authoritative voice monopol.iz.es the floor, as the
pedagogical form of the lecture mirrors the literary fonn of the article.
However, the rationale for this sort of organiz.ation is largely eroded,
Macintyre writes. Generally we no longer claim to offer accounts that are
neutral and objective. The ambition to make rationality coincide with pure
objectivity is therefore doomed to frustration. Objectivity is a myth, an idol
that no longer need claim our allegiance. Scholars acknowledge the
constitutive relation between methodology and what it is that one may claim
to know. At the forefront of virtually all disciplines, one acknowledges that
judgments are imbued with both theory and value.
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Macintyre characterizesthisabandonmentofthequestforpureob~vity
as a second model of rationality, what he calls a Nietzschian denial of the
neutrality of knowledge. This Nietzschian view equates what is~.as
knowledge with the interests of an individual, yielding a view of rationality
relative to individuals. This extreme relativism removes the ground for any
commonality of method, purpose, or visio~ ~ng the .scholars of the
university. Faced with these two unappetmng alternatives, Macintyre
refuses the choice. Instead he reconstructs from history a tradition of a
plurality of rationalities. This is the perspective ~om.which Macin~ ~
been writing for a decade, and from which he has identified both the Bnttanic
and the Nietzschian program.
..
From this third perspective, Macintyre argues that William Bennett and
Allan Bloom's case for the study of great books is fallacious. Their proposal
of a great books ·panacea for American higher educatio~ ~n.:sumes th~
Brittanie rationality of universal knowledge and pure objectivity. Yet if
readers, as Macintyre argues subscribe to different rationalities, they ~hare
no principle for generating any list of books that all readers would ~ify as
great.
. After
This argument accords with the view that Macintyre expressed m
Virtue (1981) and ~ Justice? Which Rationality? (1988~, that Western
culture is not one cohesive whole but actually inheres in differentintell~
communities. Western culture includes Nietzschian.5 as well as people like
Bennett and Bloom who continue the Brittanie quest for pure objectivity. It
includes different reading practices. Therefore, Bennett's list ?f highly
touted works will not in itself provide cohesiveness to education. The
cohesivenes.s of western culture is itself a fiction that is no longer useful. The
proposal that great books will restore American education is an unhelpful
utiliz.ation of the idol of pure objectivity. It inappropriately attempts to
reimpose the all embracing objectivityof thenintheditionBritannica in an age
where pure objectivity itself is at ~ue.
.
..
Macintyre argues rightly, I think, that contemporary uruvers1ties~enot
structured to accommodate competing rationalities. Academics continue to
write and lecture within institutional fonns that presume the possibility of
universal disinterested knowledge. Macintyre cites Foucault as an example
of the dissonance between what a person says and hi~ or her academic fonns
of expre$ion. He argues that the fonn of Foucault'sinaugural lecture of 1970
contradicts its anti-institutional content, that the strength of Foucaul~s
critique of institutional structures isitself severely weakened by the impartial
and authoritarian form in which he speaks.
As an alternative to the intellectual restrictivenes.s of the contemporary
uniyersity, Macintyre's third version of rationality is presented as having a
respectable pedigree. Macintyre adduces the work of Joseph Kleutgen, a
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largely overlooked (;erman thinker of the nineteenth century, who in his Die
Philooophieder Vorzeit (1860-1863)chamcterized Westen1culture asconsisting
of opposing philosophical traditio~ Macintyre purports to avoid the
dismal modem alternatives of pure objectivity versus relativity, by
reconstruing rationality as a craft.
.
Unlike rationality as relativity, rationality as a craft does not survive
through criticism of pure objectivity. Unlike rationality as pure objectivity,
universally right
rationality as a craft does not aspire to conclusions that
or wrong. The essence of Macintyre's proposal is the recovery of a
tradition-centered objectivity. He argues that rationality as a craft does
yield conclusions that are justified-not universally justified, but rather
justified within the community that practices this craft.
Rationality in this third version coincides with community judgments as
to how things should be thought or done. The result is a qualified objectivity,
an objectivity within a community with interests. Maclntyre's fusion of
objectivity with interest provides an account of objectivity that is very
different from the Brittanie version. While this view appears similar to Paul
Feyerabend's account of the relativity of traditions (Farewell to Reason, 1987)
Macintyre asserts that his view is in fact very different He argues that by
positioningobjectivity asoccurringwithinacommunity,heavoidsrelativity.
It seems though thatanyobjectivityisstill relative to other community bound
objectivities-Feyerabend's point
AccordingtoMaclntyreif theuniversityisfairlytorepresentmultifarious
western culture, then it should renounce the idolatry of pure objectivity. He
suggests academic fonns be modeled after dialogue rather than after the sort
of universal objectivity attempted by the ninth edition. Like Kleu~
Macintyre suggests that we take a lesson from the middle ages, and displace
lectures with dialogue and disputation in order to bring rival versions of
rationality into the university. His argument for di~utation is that if we
widen the population of rationalities then there would be a greater chance for
people to sharpen their critical skills. A greater number of opposing
rationalities would multiply views providing a wider framework within
which to distinguish options and to state why we hold the view we do.
Whence, then, are these variant rationalities to come. The "rivals"
considered so far all are· western types of rationality. Thus the western
impulse now must open itself to dialogue with what is not western. What
about Japanese literature and philosophy or the native thought of our own
land? Ifuniversities would benefit from representing opposed western types
ofrationalitythen they should benefit even more byindudingeasternas well
as western rationalities. Not only would bringing in eastern and aboriginal
rationalities provide an even greater number of options from which to
compare and criticize our.own views, but study of~, west and indigenous

are

RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MYIHOWGIES

99

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS

rationalities would prepare people better to interact internationally.
Macintyre's argument for the inclusion of western rationalities would seem
to imply that we should also construct universities ~t ~ open to ~on
westem rationalities. Yet the western concept of ratiOnality as craft nught
be inappropriate to judge eastern or native rationalities.
.
..
What would it mean to bring rival western and non western rationalities
intoouruniversities? Feyerabend has suggested that medical schools should
study traditional medicine as well as western medicine. H instructors in
eastern traditional North American, and homeopathic medicine joinmedical
faculti~I then future doctors would have a greater selection of remedies from
'
which to choose. Relegating native medicine to anthropology puts its
healing power beyond our reach.
.
.
.
Are there any options that one should exclude from a umv~ty of
dialogue and disputation? This is a hard question. I prefer the politically
correct exclusion of creationism since I don't see creationisn\as good science;
yetitmightbestudiedinotherdepartments. But a truly pluralistic university
should include all rationalities, especially those practiced by many members
ofitsownsociety. Iamthereforeinadilemmaoverthebreadthof a truly open
university devoted to disputation and understanding. Macintyre's .Three
Rival Versions Of Moral Ent1Uiry is a clever and wide ranging contribution to
the debate over the purpose of contemporary universities. It successfully
pushes us out of the institutions imprisoned by outmoded Victorian
pedagogical structures into the debates that are emerging from actual
conditions in contemporary social life.
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John Inglis, Lexington

Matthew H. Kramer. Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction:
Against Rhadamanthus. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 199L
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first
glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its gan:ie.· A text
remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its law and its rules are
not, however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply
that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could
rigorously be called a perception.

Jacques Derrida. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 63.
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Matthew H Kramer's first book is one in which Derrida's quote is taken
at full value. Working his waythrough particular texts, theories, and thinkers
from the traditions of legal and JX>litical theory, Kramer is constantly at pains
make per.ceptible the strategies in.the work he examines by showing why
1t must be unpercepbble. Detennined to elude the accusations and pat
responses that seem to plaguedeconstructivecriticism (e.g. thatitisnihilism),
Kramer is careful inhisengagementof thetextsand traditionsof JX>litical and
legal theory and maintains an awarelle$ of the necessary implications that
flow to his own text from such an approach.
Kramer focuses on three authors and the traditions which surround
them: G.A Cohen and Marxism via Karl Marx's Theory ofHistory, H.L.A. Hart
and Legal Positivism via The Concept of Law, and David Hume and
Conservatism via A Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry concerning the
Principle ofMorals, and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Kramer
concludes the book with a chapter on Critical Legal Studies, and it is here
~here his qualified allegiance lies. A brief exegesis on deconstruction
introduces the book and is quite good in familiarizing the reader with
Kramer's particularunderstandingofJacquesDerrida's philosophy. Kramer
also c?ntinues what seems to be a trend in deconstruction scholarship by
assertingthatAmericanliteraryaiticshavesomehowmisconstrued Derrida
andareusinghimfor their own purposes while others, usually philosophers,
really understand Derrida and his project
Kramer's basic strategy is to introduce each author and his tradition and
proceed to give a close reading to a particular text. In doing so, Kramer seeks
to ~n~age the ~ext on its own terms and JX>int out what incongruencies arise.
first reading provides the boundaries by which the textand the tradition
mwhich itis situated claim to bean object By spotlighting this boundaryand
the aporia of inn~ and outemess which structure it, Kramer creates the
space necessary for a strategy of deconstruction, and it is within this space
that he demonstrates the instability of the alleged boundary and the
dependence which each side necessarily involves itself. Kramer wants to
show that this instability is a necessary feature of any text or tradition which
theorizes about social or political life. He states that "[a]ll positions-be they
metaphysical or political-will perforcedismantlethemselvesas thecondition
of their beingelaborated. No position, then, canlayclaim to thedeterminancy
and coherence needed to play the part of an element in a necessary relation"
(p..148). What makes this book interesting, however, is what follows this
claim: "(T]his will be true of deconstructivecritiquesas much as of discourse
that has les.s explicitly thematiz.ed its undoing" (p. 148).
Kramer is roncemed to show deoonstruction at work and convince the
reader ~tit should be employed in the context of legal and political theory.
To do this he understands (as many do not) that the contradictions inherent
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